we find, "Here there cannot be Greek and Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave, free man, but Christ is all, and in all."28 This is a lovely index of the semantic shift. For pseudo-Paul, these designations are obviously not the names of religious formations but of various ethnic and cultural groupings,29 whereas for Epiphanius they are the names of"heresies," by which he means groups divided and constituted by religious differences fully disembedded from ethnicities: How, otherwise, could the religion called "Hellenism" have originated with the Egyptians?30 Astonishingly, Epiphanius's "Hellenism" seems to have nothing to do with the Greeks; it is Epiphanius's name for what other writers would call "paganism." Epiphanius, not surprisingly, defines "the topic of the Jews' religion" as "the subject of their beliefs."31 For Epiphanius, as for Gregory, a major category (if not the only one) for dividing human beings into groups is "the subject of their beliefs," hence the power/knowledge regime of "religion." The system of identities had been completely transformed during the period extending from the first to the fifth centuries. The systemic change resulting in religious difference as a modality of identity that began, I would suggest, with the heresiological work of Christians such as Justin Martyr works itself out through the fourth century and is closely intertwined with the triumph of orthodoxy. Orthodoxy is thus not only a discourse for the production of difference within, but functions as a category to make and mark the border between Christianity and its proximate other religions, particularly a Judaism that it is, in part, inventing.
There is a new moment in fifth-century Christian heresiological discourse. Where in previous times the general move was to call Christian heretics 'Jews" (a motif that continues alongside the "new" one), only at this time (notably in Epiphanius and Jerome) is distinguishingJudaizing heretics from orthodox Jews central to the Christian discursive project.32 As one piece of evidence for this claim, I would adduce an explosion of heresiological interest in the 'Jewish-Christian heresies" of the Nazarenes and the Ebionites at this time. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, J. K. L. Gieseler had already recognized that "the brightest moment in the history of these two groups doubtless falls about the year 400 A.D., at which time we have the best accounts concerning them."33 Given that it seems unlikely that these sects actually flourished at this time,34 we need to discover other ways of understanding this striking literary flowering. The Ebionites and Nazarenes, in my reading, function much as the mythical "trickster" figures of many religions, in that precisely by transgressing borders that the culture establishes, they reify those boundaries. 35 The discourse of the "Judaizing heretics" thus performs this very function of reinforcing the binaries.
The purpose of Epiphanius's discourse on the Ebionites and Nazarenes is to participate in the imperial project of control of (in this case) Palestine by "identifying and reifying the . . . religions." Epiphanius explicitly indicates that this is his purpose by writing of Ebion, the heresiarch-founder of the sect: "But since he is practically midway between all the sects, he is nothing. The words of scripture, 'I was almost in all evil, in the midst of the church and synagogue' [Proverbs 5:14], are fulfilled in him. For he is Samaritan, but rejects the name with disgust. And while professing to be a Jew, he is the opposite ofJews-though he does agree with them in part."36 In a rare moment of midrashic wit (one hesitates to attribute it to Epiphanius himself), the verse of Proverbs is read to mean that I was in all evil, because I was in the midst [between] the church and the synagogue. Epiphanius's declaration that the Ebionites "are nothing," especially when put next to Jerome's famous declaration that the Nazarenes think that they are Christians and Jews, but in reality are neither, strongly recalls for me the insistence in the modern period that the people of southern Africa have no religion, not because they are not Christians, but because they are not pagans.37 Suddenly it seems important to these two writers to assert a difference between Judaizing heretics and Jews. The ascription of existence to the "hybrids" assumes (and thus assures) the existence ofnonhybrid, "pure" religions. Heresiology is not only, as it is usually figured, the insistence on some right doctrine but on a discourse of the pure as opposed to the hybrid, a discourse that then requires the hybrid as its opposite term. The discourse of race as analyzed by Homi Bhabha proves helpful here: "The exertions of the 'official knowledges' of colonialism-pseudo-scientific, typological, legal-administrative, eugenicist-are imbricated at the point of their production of meaning and power with the fantasy that dramatizes the impossible desire for a pure, undifferentiated origin."38 We need only substitute "heresiological" for "eugenicist" to arrive at a major thesis of this article. Thus if on one level, orthodoxJudaism is produced as the abject of Christian heresiology, and orthodox Christianity as the abject of Jewish heresiology, on yet another level the "heretics" and the minim are the same people, perhaps literally so, but certainly discursively so: they constitute the impossible desire of which Bhabha speaks. [In our own day there exists a sect among the Jews throughout all the synagogues of the East, which is called the sect of the Minei, and is even now condemned by the Pharisees. The adherents to this sect are known commonly as Nazarenes; they believe in Christ the Son of God, born of the Virgin Mary; and they say that He who suffered under Pontius Pilate and rose again, is the same as the one in whom we believe. But while they desire to be both Jews and Christians, they are neither the one nor the other.]43
Jerome, Epiphanius
This proclamation of Jerome's comes in the context of his discussion with Augustine about Galatians 2, in which Augustine, disallowing the notion that the apostles dissimulated when they kept Jewish practices, suggests that their "JewishChristianity" was legitimate. Jerome responds vigorously, understanding the "danger" of such notions to totalizing imperial orthodoxy.44 What is new here is not, obviously, the condemnation of the "Jewish-Christian" heretics but that the Christian author condemns them, in addition, for not beingJews, thus at least implicitly marking the existence and legitimacy of a "true" Jewish religion alongside Christianity, as opposed to the falsities of the Mischlinge. This move parallels, then, Epiphanius's insistence that the Ebionites are "nothing." PushingJacobs's interpretation a bit further, I would suggest that Jerome's insistence on translating from the Hebrew is both an instance of control of the Jew (Jacobs's point) and also the very marking out of the Jews as "absolute other" to Christianity. I think it is not going too far to see here a reflection of a social and political process like the one David Chidester remarks in an entirely different historical moment: "The discovery of an indigenous religious system on southern African frontiers depended upon colonial conquest and domination. Once contained under colonial control, an indigenous population was found to have its own religious system."45 Following out the logic of this statement suggests that there may have been a similar nexus between the containment of the Jews under the colonial eye of the Christian Empire that enabled the discovery/invention of Judaism as a religion. Looked at from the other direction, the assertion of the existence of a fully separate-from-Christianity "orthodox" Judaism functioned for Christian orthodoxy as a guarantee of the Christian's own bounded and coherent identity and thus furthered the project of imperial control, as marked out byJacobs. The discursive processes in the situation of Christian Empire are very different from the projects of mutual self-definition that I have elsewhere explored.46
Hegemonic Christian discourse also produced Judaism (and paganism, for example, that ofJulian) as other religions precisely in order to cordon off Christianity, in a purification and crystallization of its essence as a bounded entity. Julian cleverly The Christian Invention ofJudaismreverses this procedure and turns it against Christianity. In at least one reading of Julian's "Against the Galileans," the point of that work is to reinstate a binary opposition between Greek andJew, Hellenism andJudaism, by inscribing Christianity as a hybrid. Eusebius's claim that one who leaves Hellenism does not land in Judaism and the reverse now constitutes an argument that Christianity itself is a monstrous hybrid, a mooncalf: "For if any man should wish to examine into the truth concerning you, he will find that your impiety is compounded of the rashness of the Jews and the indifference and vulgarity of the Gentiles. For from both sides you have drawn what is by no means their best but their inferior teaching, and so have made for yourselves a border of wickedness."47 Julian further writes: "It is worth while ... to compare what is said about the divine among the Hellenes and Hebrews; and finally to enquire of those who are neither Hellenes nor Jews, but belong to the sect of the Galileans."48 Julian, as dedicated as any Christian orthodox writer to policing borderlines, bitterly reproaches the "Galileans" for contending that they are Israelites and argues that they are no such thing, neither Jews nor Greeks but impure hybrids.49 Here Julian sounds very much like Jerome when the latter declares that those who think they are bothJews and Christians are neither, or Epiphanius when he refers to the Ebionites as "nothing." This would makeJulian's project structurally identical to the projects of the Christian heresiologists who, at about the same time, were rendering Christianity and Judaism in their "orthodox" forms the pure terms of a binary opposition, with the "Judaizing" Christians as hybrids who must be excluded from the semiotic system. I suggest, then, a deeper explanation for Julian's insistence that you cannot mix Hellenism with Christianity. It is not only that Hellenism and Christianity are separate religions that, by definition, cannot be mixed with each other, but even more that Christianity is always already (ifyou will) an admixture, a syncretism. Julian wants to reinstate the binary of Jew and Greek. He provides, therefore, another instance of the discursive form that I am arguing for in the Christian texts of his time, a horror of supposed hybrids. To recapitulate, in Julian's very formation of Hellenism (or should I say Hellenicity?),50 as a religious difference, he mirrors the efforts of the orthodox churchmen. This is another instantiation of the point made by Limberis.51 While he was protecting the borders between Hellenism and Judaism by excluding Christianity as a hybrid, Julian was in effect smuggling some Christian ideas in his attempt to outlaw Christianity.
This interpretation adds something to that ofJacobs, who writes that "among the deviant figures of Christian discourse we often find the Jew, the 'proximate other' used to produce the hierarchical space between the Christian and the nonChristian."52 I am suggesting that the heretic can also be read as a proximate other, namely using their nothingness to establish the somethingness of the absolutely distinguished "real" religions. Thus a narrative that inscribes the binary opposition between a "pure," orthodox Judaism and a "pure," orthodox Christianity, as well as the ambiguous tricksters, the Jewish/Christian hybrids, can be seen as participating in the same process of the production of absolute boundaries, of "individual and communal stability." I thus read a narrative interposed by Epiphanius, seemingly almost by accident,68 as a hermeneutic key for understanding at least one of the crucial motives of his text. It is not just, as Goranson puts it, "that the church has in the interim, from the first to the fourth centuries, decided that Ebionites and Nazarenes are heretical," but rather that the discursive project of imperial Christian self-definition requires an absolute separation from Judaism. In order to help produce that, Epiphanius (the Church) needs to make space for an orthodoxJudaism that is completely Other to Christianity. Now we can see the fifth-century explicit notices of curses of Oddly, Severus describes these relations as both an "obligation" and as a "sinful phenomenon" within the same sentence. Indeed, upon the "translation" of St.
Stephen's relics to the Christian congregations of Minorca, "even the obligation of greeting one another was suddenly broken off, and not only was our old habit of easy acquaintance disrupted, but the sinful phenomenon of our longstanding affection was translated into temporary hatred."'08 Upon the return of Theodorus, the leader of the Jews and patronus of the island, from business on Majorca, the Christians of the entire island declared "war" [bellum] on the Jews, preparing dialectical "weapons" that in the end they would not be obliged to use, while the Jews, in turn, prepared themselves for both dialectic and martyrdom, weapons that in the end they would not be privileged to use.
After Thus, rather than reading this as a moment of concord and harmony, I would propose to read it as a singular moment of violence in the text. The shared hymn singing, on this reading, is symptomatic of the pervasive ambivalence that drives the narrative. It is the fact that Jews and Christians share the same scripture and, in part, the same liturgy that produces the anxiety about borders that our text is so avid to dispel by reinforcing those very borders. Indeed, the irony that Bradbury refers to of the Easter octave during which the Jews were converted as being itself "from Jewish precedents" is another symptom of the type of religion trouble that mobilizes such textual productions.
The Epistula Severi manifests this ambivalence at its very heart. Even as it narrates the conversion of the Jews of the island without remainder, as it were, I would 
